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The Pilgrim’s Intuitive Cognition in
Pèlerinage de la vie humaine
David Strong
University of Texas at Tyler
This article maintains that the Pilgrim in Guillaume de Deguileville’s allegorical
dream vision, Pèlerinage de la vie humaine, acquires a previously unrecognized
importance through his cognitive abilities. Each personified figure’s significance
depends not upon a general introduction, but the Pilgrim’s ability to identify those
traits unique to their person. This mode of intellection mirrors the late Scholastic
epistemology of intuitive cognition as championed by John Duns Scotus and
William of Ockham. This theory allows the Pilgrim to grasp a particular object’s
certitude without relying upon universals. Since this philosophy extols intellectual
surety, it serves as a framework for interpreting the Pilgrim’s kind of knowing.

Introduction
One constant in the Pilgrim’s journey toward the New Jerusalem
in Guillaume de Deguileville’s Pèlerinage de la vie humaine is
the specific mode of acquiring knowledge.1 While the personified
figures whom he meets span the spectrum from virtue to vice, their
literal value supersedes a mere confirmation of their physicality.
The features distinguishing one from another affirm the Pilgrim’s
ability to grasp their certitude without relying upon the universals
underpinning their allegorical signification. His direct grasp of their
person reflects the principles of the late Scholastic theory known
as intuitive cognition. The epistemological surety provided by this
theory allows him to demarcate a bold line between what can be
known and what must rely upon faith. In a text that juxtaposes
opposites to depict both the potentials and limits of drawing closer
to the divine, this kind of knowing extols his cognitive powers as
1 The poem was first written in 1331 before being revised and expanded in 1355. The
revisions, which are relatively minor, key the poem to monasticism more explicitly. French
readership, however, seemingly found the first more engaging since fifty-three copies survive compared to nine for the redaction. Since the original is the only one edited, this
article follows this text.
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integral in his pilgrimage. While scholars such as Sarah Kay claim
that he struggles to “know the self as a content—as a nature present
and available to itself”—this article asserts that he does not have to
settle for a self-awareness founded upon an inability to possess that
knowledge.2 By grasping each figure’s distinct qualities, he displays
a cerebral ability that establishes his value as a thinker who is not
conflicted about his own existence or that of others.
The immediacy of these personifications prevents them
from being lost in an impersonal realm of abstraction. They come
to life via human agency. The Pilgrim’s recognition of their specific
identity makes him a vital participant in the allegorical exchanges.
Distinguishing the polyphony of voices does not rely upon “the
universalizing, systematic, monologic exegesis of reality in the
tradition of Augustine,” but emerges from the certainty generated
by the particular object as the basis of knowing.3 Despite the text’s
complexity of the self, the knowledge of his own and other’s acts
indicates an informed understanding of those issues seminal to their
intellectual milieu.4
Epistemological Reflections of Late Scholastic Thought
For all of its poetic sublimity, the impetus of the Pilgrim’s search
onward parallels the key issues championed by John Duns Scotus
(1265/6-1308) and William of Ockham (c. 1287-1347): grasping
what one can know with certainty. This article understands the
prevailing schools of thought in the late Middle Ages, namely realism
and nominalism, as complementary, for the central factors of their
epistemologies assert the primacy of the singular. Neither school
rejects universals, but examines how we know them from different
perspectives. John Duns Scotus, a moderate realist, examines what
2 Kay, The Place of Thought, 91.
3 Nievergelt, “Paradigm, Intertext, or Residual Allegory,” 30.
4 Kay explores how the spatial dislocation and the Pilgrim’s interplay with the allegorical
personifications address the philosophical issue of cogito as expressed by Augustine in On
the Trinity and other works. From this position, she then discusses how this expression
anticipates and achieves clarity in modern thought, specifically in the works of Descartes
and Lacan (90-4).
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makes these universal properties distinct. For him, these properties
exist in matter itself, but are particularized by an individuating factor
called “thisness” or “haecceity.”5 He defines the fine line separating
the universal and the individual as a formal distinction. For example,
if one looks at a chair, that person knows that this chair is an individual
because an intuitive grasp of its haecceity distinguishes it from an
otherwise similar one. Although the universal and particular cannot
exist without one another, Scotus maintains that a logical distinction
delineates the two.
Whereas Scotus acknowledges the reality of universals,
they are merely conceptual for his nominalist successor William
of Ockham. He perceives universals solely as abstract entities.
Subsequently, Ockham explains the individual not by reference to
the universal but rather the opposite, to account for universals in a
world of individuals. He disrupts the concord between concepts and
reality. Although this disruption causes realists to fear the seeming
incompatibility of faith-inspired knowledge with nominalism, he
stresses the positive powers of the thinker. By following Scotus
in making the individual object directly accessible to the intellect,
Ockham also affirms the direct experience of particulars and the
integral value of the intellect in providing certain knowledge. Neither
Scotus nor Ockham supplants faith with intellectual knowledge.
Classic literary studies of how this kind of investigation
enlightens our appreciation of medieval texts come to light most
vividly in Chaucerian studies. Russell Peck and James Wimsatt
demonstrate how ideas pivotal to Scotus and Ockham clarify
questions underlying Chaucer’s oeuvre. Wimsatt shows how Scotus
influences modern thinkers, particularly Charles Sanders Peirce and
how the pervasiveness of Scotist thought seeps into literary thought.
He employs this moderate realism to explicate how the Canterbury
pilgrims can be seen as both common types and individuals.6 Peck
5 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II. d. 3; Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, ed. Spade, 93-113.
6 Wimsatt, “John Duns Scotus, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Chaucer’s Portrayal of the
Canterbury Pilgrims,” 633-45.
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qualifies the salience of nominalist thought by stating that Chaucer
“may not be interested in whether we can know with certitude only
individual things, [but] he is profoundly interested in how we know
individual things.” His qualification enables him to claim that a core
appreciation of Chaucer’s poetry revolves around an exaltation of the
human phenomena of experience.7 As the principles comprising this
phenomenon parallel those of Ockhamist thought, an informed study
of intuitive cognition enhances our understanding of Deguileville’s
poem and its cultural dependence.
To posit that universals exist but that all we ever experience
are individuals proves salient to a text so immersed in epistemological
matters. It validates the Pilgrim’s reliance upon specific objects to
identify the figures whom he meets. The reality within his dream
vision is radically individual. It discards the traditional iconography
of personified vices and remedial virtues to convey meaning, such as
Cupid appearing as the baby angel.8 Each figure possesses a unique
trait, specifically tailored to his or her purport. For example, Grace
Dieu’s crown of stars and rubies depicts her divine origins. As they
enable the Pilgrim to grasp their presence, this emphasis mirrors
the epistemological view that the ultimate intelligible object is not
the genus or species but the individual.9 For Scotus and Ockham, it
begins with an unmediated cognitive act, which provides a simple,
non-judgmental awareness of an object as existing and present:
7 Peck, “Chaucer and the Nominalist Questions,” 745-60.
8 Norman, Metamorphoses of an Allegory, 187.
9 Scotian and Ockhamist views, in accord with medieval thought generally, gave paramount importance to gaining knowledge about God, praising it as a laudable rational endeavor. Still, disputes arose in academic circles concerning how one acquires such knowledge. At the center of these disputes lay the problem of universals and the strong theological
implications they raised. “Universals” are the general terms categorizing a multiplicity of
individuals—such as the word “humanity,” applied to all humans, or “man” or “woman”
applied to some. Until the Aristotelian revival in the thirteenth century, philosophers like
Augustine commonly perceived universal natures as existing independently of the particulars whose natures they signify. Following the revival, however, medieval thinkers like
Scotus and Ockham redefined this epistemology. Their revolution focused upon particular
objects. See Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, ed. Spade, i-xii.
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Intuitive cognition of a thing is cognition that enables us to know whether
the thing exists or does not exist, in such a way that, if the thing exists,
then the intellect immediately judges that it exists and evidently knows
that it exists, unless the judgment happens to be impeded through the
imperfection of the cognition.10

Both the senses and the intellect can generate certain knowledge
of specific objects. Each object is radically individual, an essence
by itself, thus eliminating the notion that universals define reality.
Ockham rejects any kind of intermediary or individuating difference
between the object and the universal and, by doing so, asserts the
ontological primacy of the singular.11
On this point, he finds more in common with his Parisian
confrère, Peter Olivi (1248-98), who believes that if a species were
perceived in the cognizer, then it “would veil the thing and impede
its being attended to in itself as if present, rather than aid in its being
attended to.”12 Olivi’s influence of Ockham stems from the belief
that the only act of cognition that matters is the one that perceives
the object itself, which eliminates any need for any mediating act or
species to interfere with the person’s object.
While his reliance upon Olivi concerning the refutation of
species is unmistakable, it is “more significant because, whether
Ockham had read Olivi’s Sentences commentary directly or knew
his views only through some intermediary source, the Provençal
Franciscan’s commentary was evidently not widely familiar to
scholars in England.”13 Ockham was one of the first English
philosophers to embrace the teachings of Parisian opponents of
intelligible or sensible species as Peter Olivi, Henry of Ghent (c.
1217-93), and Gerard of Bologna (d. 1317).14 In turn, Ockham’s
10 William of Ockham, Ordinatio 1, prol. 1 (OTh I: 31); Philosophical Writings, trans.
Boehner, 23.

11 For Scotus, universals exist; they are not merely conceptual. While each object has the
formal entity of singularity and that of a common nature, the two are “always formally distinct realities of the same thing” (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, q. 6; Five Texts on
the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, ed. Spade, 107). Scotus believes that the universal
and particular, though distinct, cannot exist without one another. A logical distinction both
divides and unites the two. This way one can claim that universals exist, but also maintain
that all we ever experience are individuals.
12 Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 58 ad. 14; Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastic Medii Aevi, ed. Jansen, 469.
13 Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 130.
14 Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 125-33.
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writings became known and respected at the University of Paris in
the late 1320’s, which arguably results from him leaving England
and staying in Avignon from 1324 to 1328. Here he interacts with
“an international community of scholars, many of whom had been
trained in the more diverse intellectual environment of Paris.”15 These
Parisian thinkers learn to receive his ideas with “a sensationalism
born of an overly strict application of supposition theory in Arts
and the restructuring of approaches in Theology through the use of
sophisms and obligations.”16 This rapprochement between French
and English thought attests to an active exchange of ideas.
Allegory’s Immediate Presence
With these ideas in mind, the issue before Deguileville’s protagonist
is not if he can envision the New Jerusalem, but if he can establish
its extant reality. The narrative opens with him looking into a mirror
and seeing the New Jerusalem. Its dominant features resemble this
world. It rests upon a stone foundation with high walls surrounded
by mansions peopled occupying a cross section of society: lay and
secular, clergy and religious, beggars and the needy (119-20). He
even observes the members of established religious orders, such as
the Dominicans and Augustinians, as well as eminent founders of
their own orders, Sts. Benedict and Francis. Their presence affirms
that scholastic learning paves the way towards the city.
En un mirour, ce me sembloit,
Qui sanz mesure grans estoit
Celle cite aparceue
Avoie de loing et veue.
Mont me sembloit de grant atour
Celle cite ens et entour.
Les chemins et les alees
D’or en stoient paves,
En haut assis son fondement
Estoit et son maconnement
De vives pierres fait estoit
Et haut mur entour la clooit (39-50).17
15 Courtenay, “The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham,” 24.
16 Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,” 50.
17 Deguileville, Le Pèlerinage de vie humaine.
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[In a mirror, it seemed to me that this city that I had seen from afar was
large beyond measure. It was very ornate both inside and out. The paths
and lanes were paved with gold. The foundation was set up high, the
masonry was made of living stones, and a high wall enclosed it on all
sides.]

Jerusalem celestial does exist, but the Dreamer/Pilgrim’s grasp of its
immediacy is imperfect. He perceives only an image: streets paved
with gold and people filled with joy. While familiar objects confirm
a supernal reality, its existence rests upon an image, not an actuality.
Still, these impressions embed itself upon the internal senses—the
imagination and memory, spurring him onwards. Recognizable
objects affirm and substantiate an existent relationship. Ockham
maintains that the impressed quality of these objects rather than a
species inclines the faculty to act.18 They prompt him to seek out
their immediate presence because no matter what intensifies or
clarifies this vision, it cannot cause an effect the same as the one
it represents. The ensuing pilgrimage is thus predicated upon the
desire to gain a direct vision of this city.
As depicted by these images, allegory utilizes different lines
of signification—literal and figural, poetic and philosophic—to
modify each other, enabling one to comprehend heaven. Frédéric
Duval warns against interpreting every sign under the umbrella of
universal symbolism and points out how one must constantly assess
if the object operates as le signe or a thing.19 Res, the actual object,
must not be ignored. The Dreamer/Pilgrim’s process of knowing
is governed by a clear order of precedence springing from the
particular to the universal in initiating movement between the actual
and allegorical. Its surety ensures a solid foundation so that a fluid
relationship can flow between these binaries. He must then embark
upon a journey so that he can grasp the actuality of these objects.
He desires a reality founded upon a material or immanent object to
verify his cognitive abilities. At times, the objects he encounters are
18 Ockham, III Rep. q. 3; OTh VI: 114.
19 Duval, “Interpréter le Pèlerinage de vie humaine de Guillaume de Digulleville,”
242-3.
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ideally suited to his experiential understanding; at other times, he
struggles to appreciate their import. Nonetheless, his perceptions, as
Susan Hagen notes, consistently stimulate an inner drive to pursue
this celestial truth:
A view of an actual object, even an object seen spatially displaced,
initiates stronger emotions than does a representation of it. Second only
to a direct view of the Heavenly City, which the pilgrim cannot enjoy
until the conclusion of his earthly life and journey, amirrored reflection
of the celestial Jerusalem remains the most compelling sight he can
behold. It is little wonder, then, that it can so strongly stir him in his
desire to set about his pilgrimage. Like nothing else within the poem, the
city maintains an existence both inside and outside the narrative in much
the same way as it appears both in and “outside its place.”20

The mirror image of the New Jerusalem incites his aesthetic wonder
to such a degree that the natural impulse is to confirm its verity. The
only accurate measurement of certitude stems from a knowledge of
existent, singular things. It establishes a connection between knower
and object that was simple, direct, and true. Only a pilgrimage where
he can interact directly with those figures bridging the two realms
can his thirst for knowledge be quenched. These interactions center
upon individual objects that can be directly apprehended by intuition
and without the mediation of species. To maximize his potential, the
Dreamer must then transition into a pilgrim.
The ensuing dream vision interlaces the spirit with the
mundane through personifications. The first one whom the Pilgrim
meets is Grace Dieu. As God’s daughter, she appears in a sensually
vibrant, imperial garb. Adorned in gown of beaten gold, she wears a
sash of green lamé and an auric crown encircled by shining stars. The
explicit attention to the objects beautifying her person shows that
she does not merely represent a transcendent being but a physical
one too. While Philippe Maupeu views her allegorical import as
superseding that of her extant reality, these stunning features stress
that the field of inquiry begins with this reality.21 The Pilgrim’s
observations draw a direct correlation between mind and matter,
20 Hagen, Allegorical Remembrance, 28.
21 Maupeu, Pèlerins De Vie Humaine: Autobiographie et allégorie narrative, 136.
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spiritual instruction and human want. Via her tangible properties, he
understands that such adornment conveys authority:
Vois tu comment sui paree
Et cointement sui atournee
D’escharboucles et d’esteles?
Onques ne vëis plus belles,
C’est pour tous ceuz enluminer
Qui de nuit veulent cheminer,
C’est pour ce que chascun me truist
Aussi bien de jour com de nuit
Et aussie bien de nuit com de jour,
A ce que ne facent folour. (305-14)
[Do you see how I am dressed, elegantly arrayed with rubies and stars?
You have never seen any more beautiful. It’s to give light to all those
who want to travel at the night, so that everyone can trust me, alike in the
day or at night and not err.]

She emphasizes how her dress illuminates her importance, relying
explicitly upon the Pilgrim’s ability to grasp the surety of these rubies
and stars. Their radiating brilliance proves not only the underlying
value of the material, but also how symbolic mediation reveals
something greater. The light serves as a beacon of God’s love and
exposes the emptiness of vice, disclosing the coexistence between
intellectual and faith-inspired knowledge. Grace Dieu is a woman
whose appearance renders the abstract visible. Her accoutrements
both individuate and validate her person. She is, as Ockham states,
“not a mere collection of parts of the same nature, like the unity
of an army, city or heap of sand, but the coming together of parts
having different natures and yet constituting something substantially
one.”22 Her oneness springs from actual features, which enables him
to confirm a transcendent goodness. The certitude of the conclusion
depends upon the certitude of these objects and the evidence of the
inference.
Although her regality suggests a wisdom surpassing the
mind’s purview, those traits that she shares with the Pilgrim
captivate his interest. He inquires about her country of origin and
22 Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham, 453.
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qualifications. His questions illustrate a need to relate on a personal
level. Cultivating such a rapport attests to a self-awareness of
how to better his person. By asking her name, he wishes to lessen
the hierarchical authority attached to her appearance and foster
a constructive discourse that will enable him to succeed in his
pilgrimage. Her name and visual image define her individuality.
This link, however, poses certain analytical challenges. Paul de
Man believes that labeling a figure in a fiction with an abstract name
may generally categorize this kind of allegory, but her role as both
friend and authoritative representative urges greater sensitivity to
what the name signifies: the literal or metaphorical, the individual
or universal, or both simultaneously.23 As her jeweled light verifies
both her worldly and otherworldly existence, the Pilgrim’s query
underscores her unique singularity.
Still, De Man points out that the allegorical metaphor must
refer to another, preceding sign “with which it can never coincide,
since it is of the essence of this previous sign to be pure anteriority.”24
Although he does not address the philosophical question of universals,
his belief that the “essence” must be shared by its opposite, marked
either by its presence or absence, echoes the questions of universals
raised by Scotus and Ockham. Both philosophers, though separating
it from the particular, did not discount its existence. Ockham writes,
“Insofar as it [the universal] can be predicated of many things not
for itself but for these many, it is said to be a universal; but insofar
as it is a particular form actually existing in the intellect, it is said
to be a particular.”25 Grace Dieu’s presence signifies not only an
individual entity, but also a truth beyond empirical evidence. An
identifiable factor sparks the process of knowing. This process
devalues neither pole; instead, it produces a frame of reference to
grasp allegory’s dual structure and accord merit to those singular
objects often perceived as secondary to the abstract import.
23 De Man, Allegories of Reading, 188-220.
24 De Man, “Rhetoric of Temporality,” 207.
25 Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Terms, 78.
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Cognizing Grace Dieu’s verity substantiates her being as
much as the Pilgrim’s. As it lends credence to her words, it also
affirms his response as genuine. He declares that knowing her will
make him happier. He pleads, “Dame, pour Dieu merci vous pri/
Qu’a vous me vueilliez acointier/ Ne ja ne me veuilliez laissier”
(380-2). [By God, I beg you to have mercy so that you may want to
be with me and never want to leave me.] By expressing his longing
to remain in her company, he strives to lessen the division between
leader and follower, personalizing their bond. The pilgrimage is
not founded upon an idealized abstraction. Sensory stimuli and the
passion to foster the accompanying emotional connections intensify
these interactions. They are not stoic exchanges of information,
but vivifying dialogues which attest to the fact that God’s creation,
though individually conceived, must operate communally to
appreciate His full goodness. Sensory acts are apprehended
intuitively by the interior sense.26 This inner awareness validates the
subjective reactions of the Pilgrim as honest and worth pursuing.
His connection with others depends upon the utilizing the spectrum
of his cerebral faculties, acts of knowing as well as mental states,
such as joy and sadness. By demonstrating a profound use of his
cerebral abilities, the Pilgrim rises above the one-dimensionality of
a garden-variety Everyman.
Attentive to his needs, Grace Dieu makes every effort
to eliminate any doubt that could interfere with their burgeoning
friendship: “Point ne vueil ester douteuse/ A toi ne souspeconneuse”
(295-6). [I do not want to be at all puzzling or mysterious to you.]
She recognizes his need for certainty. As God’s daughter, she
explains the allegorical significance underlying her adornment.
Her light gives sight to the blind and illuminates virtue’s path for
those who have gone astray. She accordingly employs visually
stimulating objects to ground her argument. She leads him to a
house floating high in the air. Its steeples, fine towers, and expanse
of water show how mundane objects can aid in understanding the
heavenly (400-10). The house signifies the Church and the water
26 William of Ockham, Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 255: 92-4.

Quidditas 35 (2014) 221

denotes the trials of living in this world. These objects attest to an
inextricable bond between the two realms, which intrinsically relies
upon the knowledge already acquired by the Pilgrim. Furthermore,
as pointed out by De Man’s notion of a preceding sign, these stately
objects refer back to the first-order of the divine, namely the ultimate
origin of their creation. Grace Dieu’s wisdom stems not only from
her otherworldly source, but also her link with a concrete sphere of
praxis. The vertical and horizontal axes comprising her allegorical
construct, therefore, “continually intersect.”27 Her presence verifies
the truth of her origins and invites the Pilgrim to respond to her
as someone who can provide essential help. This kind of contact
prevents the narrative from slipping into a speculative discourse and
proves illustrative of her heritage.
Each subsequent encounter with a personified figure begins
not with an introduction, but by identifying those accoutrements
unique to that figure. They serve as the basis in defining his or her
function.28 For example, Moses as a vicar of the Church appears
with staff in hand and horns on his head: “Quar en sa main tenir li
vi/ Une verge au bout crocue/ Et si’ avoit teste cornue” (514-6). [I
saw that he had in his hand a staff with a crook at the end and that
he had horns on his head.] These extant objects affirm not only their
being, but also disclose how the spirit permeates this world. Yet,
drawing the connection between object and idea is not founded upon
religious devotion, but by the mind itself, which further underscores
the Pilgrim’s powers. For example, Moses’ himself cannot make
this connection explicitly until he meets Raison. Raison explains
that the staff enables him to administer those sacraments requiring
the use of Holy Oils: baptism, confirmation, and extreme unction.
These anointed acts as effected by the crozier serve as the basis of
ecclesiastical authority. The horns also signify such authority, but
stem from mistranslation of Exodus 34:29 in the Vulgate of the
Hebrew word, “cornuta,” which can mean either “beam of light” or
27 Van Dyke, The Fiction of Truth, 45.
28 The only exception to these allegorical portrayals is Raison. However, this article contends that the Pilgrim himself is the distinct manifestation of this personification.
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“horn.”29 Despite this error, the tradition was so strongly ingrained
that the twelfth century bishops’ miters had two points arranged like
horns.30 Her explanation establishes the overt use of the mind in
helping link the two realms, which implicitly elevates the value of
human agency.
Later in Book I, the Pilgrim meets two women, Charity
and Penance, whose defining features are a hand-held document
and a broom in the mouth, respectively. The image of biting down
on a broom as well as holding a hammer in the right hand and a
switch in her left prompts C. S. Lewis to declaim these allegories
as “monstrosities.”31 The bulky incongruity of such imagery,
however, marks the ingenuity of Deguileville; it prioritizes the role
of particular objects in the process of knowing. Her remarkable
appearance captures the Pilgrim’s attention to such a degree that he
cannot divert his eyes. Acknowledging his curiosity, she proclaims:
Que bien regardés mon maintien,
Mes bien croi que ne savez mie
Que mon maintien vous senefie;
Si venez prés, je le dirai,
Ne ja de rien n’en mentirai (2040-4)
[I know that you are looking carefully at my array, but I think you have
no idea what this array means to you. Come near and I will tell you. I
will not lie to you about anything.]

While the act of reconciliation occupies a central place in Christian
thought, her distinctive look demands that the Pilgrim acknowledge
her inimitable existence. It shatters any preconceptions of what
characterizes forgiveness. Yet, her actions support the orthodox
tenets of confession. The mallet breaks the human heart with
29 “As Moses came down from Mount Sinai with the two tablets of the commandments in
his hands, he did not know that the skin of his face had become radiant while he conversed
with the Lord” (Exodus 34:29). “Cumque descenderet Moses de monte Sinai tenebat duas
tabulas testimonii et ignorabat quod cornuta esset facies sua ex consortio sermonis Dei.”
30 Henry, ed., The Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode, 369.
31 Lewis, The Allegory of Love. Upon reading such descriptions, “we can almost excuse
the last century of criticism for rejecting allegory root and branch as a mere disease of
literature (269).”
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contrition when it is hardened with sin, the broom sweeps away its
filth through a complete confession, and the switch chastises the
Christian so that he remembers the pain inflicted by vice. As the
external properties signify their internal worth, they illustrate her
conceptual import. The Pilgrim’s focus shows that she is a complete
intellectual nature that does not exist in another as in a subject and
cannot form a substantial unity with something else as its part. She
stands alone as the power effecting compunction.
For Charity, the document in her hands, the “testament de
pais,” distinguishes her from the other personifications (2457). She
never contemns the mighty or meek, but loves all people with her
whole heart. She clothes the naked, feeds the hungry, and visits
the sick. The document’s purpose is simple. It identifies those acts
consonant with her character. Since love is one of the most expansive
concepts in any language, this list work helps flesh out her person.
While the multiplicity of roles attributed to her may seem at odds
with being an individual, this written work is itself one particular
thing and that it is not a universal except in the different lines of
signification flowing from it. Her abundance of talents manifests
itself in divers activities. Gordon Teskey believes that a “certain
agency is attributed to abstractions that, in predicating themselves,
overflow their limits and cascade into the world, where they take
up a partial residence in things.”32 These “things” lie within the
Pilgrim’s grasp and his cognition reveals that the knowledge he
seeks possesses an actual existence, not a vague, ahistorical one.
As Charity’s substance imprints itself upon these things, she allows
each human to forge the best path towards New Jerusalem.
Although the text consistently relies upon distinctive features
to identify each figure, one encounter deviates from this pattern.
Raison appears with no fanfare or flourish.33 She simply descends
32 Teskey, Allegory and Violence. He cites Plato’s Third Man argument to account for
the idea that two opposites can share something that is separate from each. “This can be
nothing other than a Third Man, which must in turn share something with the first two, and
so on” (14).
33 Although Nature is also not assigned a feature unique to her person, old age separates
her from the others.
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the escarpment and begins speaking matter-of-factly to the Pilgrim.
Conspicuous by its absence, this lack of a distinguishing trait causes
the reader to pause. The answer lies in what she represents. She is
the defining element of humankind, separating us from the animals
(855). As the paragon of her nobility, the Pilgrim possesses intimate
knowledge of her allegorical person. Raison, therefore, needs no
ancillary trait. When Grace tells him her name, it merely affirms
Raison’s integral role in God’s creative design. In addition, the
closeness between these two genders metaphorically signifies a
sacrosanct union. This bond comports with the tenets of intuitive
cognition. Ockham explains that in the present life our intellect
knows its own acts of knowing and willing intuitively without
any preceding sensory intuition.34 Humans form a contingent
proposition about the intellect’s knowing and our willing, such as
“I am knowing” and “I am willing.” The intellect’s self-awareness
provides the evidence of the proposition.35 Vision is not necessary to
perceive something intuitively.
I concede that there is intuitive cognition in every sense, interior as well
as exterior—that is, such cognition by virtue of which, in the aforesaid
way, a thing is known to be or not to be; granted, this is not ocular
intuitive cognition. And in this, many are deceived: for they believe that
there is no intuitive cognition unless it is ocular, which is false.36

Raison’s unembellished appearance proves that she is not known
through ocular clues, but an internal awareness. No reason exists
to inquire about her character since he already knows that she
exists and what (s)he can do. She provides direct access to his
phenomenological constitution.
Raison may not have immediate access to the ineffable, but she
can explain how divine operates within this world. After delivering
a discourse on the sacraments, she answers Moses’ question about
the purpose for the horns on his head and the pointed staff. The staff
34 William of Ockham, Quodlibetal I.14; OTh IX: 78-82.
35 Ockham, Quodlibetal I.14; OTh IX: 79.11-16
36 Ockham, II Rep. q. 12-13; OTh V: 269.
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recalls the shepherd’s duty to prod sheep onwards parallel a vicar’s
responsibility to guide his flock towards a higher goodness. Its
sharpness highlights the urgency to stay true to Christian ideals and
protect his congregation from any dissolution of purpose. Raison’s
extrapolation of how an evident judgment of existence can lead to
a more expansive truth illustrates the movement from intuitive to
abstractive cognition. Abstractive cognition refers not so much to the
imagination as to a conceptual process of understanding an idea.37
The particular object serves as the basis to conceive a concept.38
Therefore, the horns and staff can signify not only those properties
particular to Moses, but also to his ecclesiastical brethren and their
duties.
According to Ockham, the origin of all experiential knowledge
of contingent truths, and all abstractive and scientific knowledge
of necessary truths derive from previous intuitive cognition.39 As
Raison focuses upon the proof of existence to develop her discourse,
she stresses how her power delineates humans from animals.
Je sui Raison par qui estes
Discerne des autres bestes.
Tant come avec vous m’avrez
Tant seulement homes serez,
Et quant sans moy voudrez aler,
Bien vous pouez de ce vanter
Que n’estes mais que bestes mues
Et que jumens qui sont vestues (855-62).
[I am Reason, by whom you are distinguished from the other animals. As
long as you will have me with you, you will be real men, and you will
want to try to go without me the only thing you can boast of is that you
are nothing but naked beasts, mules dressed up in clothes.]

Her self-awareness mirrors that of the Pilgrim. He recognizes how
she defines his self. Paradoxically, she both individuates and unites
37 Ockham, I Ordinatio prol. q. 1; OTh I: 23-4.
38 Ockham, I Ord. q. 3; OTh II: 483-521.
39 Ockham, I Quodl. Q.13; OTh IX: 72-78.
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him with other humans. Thus, his mind accords him a respected
place among those hypostatized figures of virtue whom he meets.
That he can apprehend with certitude specific truths in
this world reveals the inherent goodness of God’s creation. “God
communicates his goodness as something befitting his beauty, in
each species and delights in producing a multiplicity of individuals.
. . . And in those beings which are the highest and most important, it
is the individual that is primarily intended by God.”40 The Pilgrim’s
process of knowing testifies to the importance of the individual
as both thinker and an object of knowledge in his pilgrimage. It
establishes that he is singularly loved by the divine. Moreover,
cognizing these objects reveals where he must supplant intellectual
surety with faith. This becomes apparent when Raison admits
that the transubstantiation as performed by Moses eludes her
understanding.
Quar nulle chose je n’I sai;
Cy me faut mon entendement
Et mon sens tout outreement,
Avugle sui, je n’I voi goute,
Perdue (i) ai ma veue toute (1476-80).
[“My understanding and my wits fail me completely here. I am blind. I
cannot see anything. I have completely lost my sight.]

Changing bread into Christ’s body and wine into His blood defies
reason. However, these limitations are neither counterproductive to
his search nor without precedent. First, seeking manifest proof of
the New Jerusalem is a natural endeavor, not folly. It attests to the
faith in the certitude generated by the mirror image of this spiritual
city. Second, she openly acknowledges that carnal love also clouds
her vision, citing the difficulties she experiences in Le Roman de la
Rose as an example (882). While on different ends of the spectrum,
spiritual enlightenment and sexual passion operate in realms where
different modes of knowing predominate, ecstatic and sensory,
respectively. Raison acknowledges the bounds of her domain and
40 Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3; Early Oxford Lecture on Individuation, trans. Wolter, xxi.
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uses this knowledge to address those matters most in line with her
talents.
In Book II, she comes to the defense of the Pilgrim when a
scowling, misshapen churl called Rude Entendement accosts him.
Aptly, this philistine carries a club: “N’est pas baston bien avenant/ A
preudomme ne bien seant” (5171-2). Unimpressed by her appearance,
he questions her authority. Raison asks the Pilgrim to read a letter
which clarifies her role as an executor of good deeds who must put
a halt to Rude Entendement’s harassment of earnest wayfarers.
Rude Entendement, as indicative of his allegorical import, fails to
accept the missive’s veracity. Instead, he elects to rely upon what he
overhears at the mill to define her character (5279-80). Since those
buying the grain continually use the term “raison” to exploit the
farmers selling their crops, he associates her with acts of disrepute
and deception. Annoyed at this brutish accusation, she launches into
a lengthy defense. She points out that selfish people often misuse
the meaning of terms to advance their own agendas. This semantic
abuse undermines her power. It is one thing to claim that it accords
with reason and another thing to have that name: “Autre chose est
ester Raison/ Et autre chose avoir son non” (5293-4). Her name
is self-predicating. The people at the mill, however, are not bound
by these principles. Their actions are not accurate measurements of
integrity. The parameters of her very being prevent her from doing
anything other than determining the existential surety of a particular
object and extrapolate upon its conceptual importance. She protects
the Pilgrim from earthly ne’er-do-wells.
Through his interactions with the personified allegories,
the Pilgrim comes to understand that reality, either material or
immanent, is radically individual and knowable. His manner of
knowing operates within a specific epistemological framework
consonant with the intellectual zeitgeist, namely intuitive cognition.
In his study of French poetry and late medieval thought, Ullrich
Langer observes that the literary and philosophical elements within
a text operate as related but separate cultural phenomena:
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Yet an emphasis on certain concepts, rather than on the impact of an
individual’s or a school’s entire thought, seems heuristically more valid
and more faithful to what literature is about. A literary text does not
attempt to represent truthfully contemporary figures or their thought,
but reworks key attitudes, experiences, sensation, and concepts into an
imaginative whole that is in a sense incommensurable with the initial
givens (though not unrelated to them).41

Literary discourse does not seek to posit a definitive statement
of or resolution to a philosophical view. Rather, it dramatizes the
issues presented, deepening the meaning underpinning its structure.
The result provides a more nuanced understanding of the relation
between the two discourses with the ultimate point of reference
remaining with the poem. As such, Deguileville’s allegory gains
clarity through those ideas which complement its design and advance
its thematic purport. The “certain concepts” illuminating the text are
those that promote individual abilities. The certitude generated by
these individuals ensures that the counsel offered by the personified
figures does not drift into abstruse speculation.
Encounters with these figures reveal and punctuate specific
cognitive aspects of his person so that his identity emerges with a
striking intensity. It testifies to an independent ability that refutes any
suggestion that individuals do not pertain to the order of the universe.
Such a statement devalues neither the theological nor soteriological
premises underlying the pilgrimage, but rather supplements them.
The epistemological stratagems reveal an intricate design of
knowing that affords him a distinct value in discerning both the
literal and figural import of the personifications. The systems of
reference flowing between the literary and philosophical elements
foster a dialectical, mutually defining relationship which produces
an optimistic sense of what it means to be human.

41 Langer, Divine and Poetic Freedom in the Renaissance, 10.
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